The study also implies unrestrained improvement in PV industries to lower costs and increase efficiency without noting theoretical limitations or the quantum leap needed to lift solar to even half of the capacity of nuclear.
By Dr. J. Eric Cooper
The "study" by Dr. Blackburn and Mr. Cunningham "Solar and Nuclear Costs – The Historic Crossover" at Duke University has spurred numerous articles condemning the fate of nuclear power. Yet the "study" was prepared for an anti-nuclear group; most of the resultant articles and press reports jubilantly and uncritically broadcast the report as fact. In so doing important issues confronting us are further obfuscated, thereby jeopardizing informed decision-making that will affect the economy, businesses, energy availability, and technological innovation for years to come. The stakes are high; decisions made now may have lasting and profound consequences.
Blackburn and Cunningham argue (p.9) that the distinction between, and the critically different roles of, intermittent power and baseload sources are nigh obsolete because of new storage techniques and the smart grid. Both are critical essentials but fraught with challenges; they may not be fully available for decades, and will cost trillions to implement regardless the time horizon. The study trumpets non-existent future fixes as if they are present reality, by promising solutions that may never materialize and disregarding the real-world experience of utilities, grid-operators, and numerous experts. They ignore real-world examples: Germany, an aggressive wind and solar country, could not await the smart grid or find practicable storage technologies; it now buys lots of nuclear-produced power from France.
Capacity factor and cost are similarly mishandled. The authors (p.18) use 18% as their initial factor. The modern DeSoto photovoltaic (PV) array in Florida topped out at 19%, whereas northern latitudes are less – similar to European solar returns of 10% – 11%. Further, the study assumes undiminishing efficacy and forgets that generally PV arrays lose 10% of original efficiency every 10 years. The net cost for PV was calculated by including a 30% Federal and a 35% North Carolina tax credit – disingenuous when arguing PV's superiority because nuclear requires subsidies – and replacement of arrays was excluded. All of the proposed nuclear plants in America will operate 60-100 years with a capacity factor of over 90%, whereas at least four full array replacements would be needed to maintain about 17% average for DeSoto. To scale up to nuclear power DeSoto would initially cost over $11 billion, compared to $6 billion for the 1,600 megawatt nuclear plant that was slated for Missouri. DeSoto would then incur multiple costly array-replacement cycles while never approaching nuclear's present capacity factor.
Further, the study forgets that PV loses efficacy the second debris (pollution, dust, rain-water stains, pollen, etc.) begins covering the panels and consequently requires washing. Major solar farms in Nevada and California were cancelled due to this insurmountably expensive problem. Neither state has sufficient water available for the requisite washing frequency; use of non-water cleaning agents produced unaffordable cost projections approaching 60 cents per kilowatt-hour.
The study also implies unrestrained improvement in PV industries to lower costs and increase efficiency without noting theoretical limitations or the quantum leap needed to lift solar to even half of the capacity of nuclear. Nor is it observed that technologies and improvements now can be implemented to increase nuclear efficiency and lower costs even more. Indeed, Blackburn and Cunningham use a contentious 2009 study by Dr. Mark Cooper (no relation to this author) as their foundation for nuclear costs, ignoring other literature and recent real-world prices and data. Both studies forego evaluating the very different socio-political and regulatory environments of the 70s and 80s to the present, which inherently distorts the outcome. Worse, as academics, Blackburn and Cunningham must have been aware that Cooper's study was informed by his career fighting rate hikes for clients. Yet the authors make no mention of the prejudiced data upon which they predicate their entire argument on nuclear prices. Nor did they research any of the plentiful data challenging the pricing model used.
There are many other contentious points that one could raise. Issues like the suspicious lack of distinction between water consumption and use, and the insinuation that certain efficiency technologies cannot be used by nuclear (p.5) are more minor. Their flawed approach used in assessing job and economic impacts (p.10, needing tax subsidies for solar) and hiding that financing problems are endemic to all major energy projects (e.g. Solana, a solar project, is $500 million over 2009 estimates), are far more serious but would exceed space permitted to treat adequately.
Blackburn and Cunningham do what they were paid to do: support solar and lambast nuclear power. To the uninformed, it is effective. It avidly avoids balanced perspective and a preponderance of data. I advise several alternative energy companies – nuclear and non – and believe firmly that all alternative energy sources need to be cultivated and improved, and new technologies developed. But the facts must be presented fully and fairly, so that the decisions we contemplate are informed and we may choose a path that is feasible, efficient and prosperous. To that end, Blackburn and Cunningham do great disservice.